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THE AMAZING THREE-HEADED LIMITED PARTNER:




The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Nordile Holdings Ltd. v. Breckenridge' breaks new ground in the
law of limited partnerships in Canada. It suggests that a limited
partner who doubles as a director or officer of a corporate general
partner, or who otherwise "takes part in the management ' 2 of the
partnership business, may nevertheless retain her limited liability
status.
Although the court purported to follow the watershed case of
Haughton Graphic Ltd. v. Zivot,3 a closer look reveals a radical
departure from that decision. According to the judges in Nordile,
limited partnership investors can, with some careful planning,
maintain three different legal personalities concurrently. The case
effectively allows a limited partner to act simultaneously as (i) a
corporate executive with full managerial powers, (ii) a limited
liability investor in relation to third-party creditors, and (iii) a
business proprietor for income tax purposes. Contrary to previous
indications in the Haughton Graphic case, it appears that the
three-headed limited partner is alive and well and living in B.C.
For those who deal with limited partnerships, Nordile injects a
new element of uncertainty into the question of limited-partner
liability, particularly since the case is not being appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada. This article will analyze and contrast
Nordile with the earlier, precedent-setting decision in Haughton
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I am indebted to Jamie
Cassels, Maureen Maloney and Chris Tollefson for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. I alone, of course, am responsible for the final version.
1(1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 183 (C.A.), affg [1991] B.C.W.L.D. 860 (S.C.).
2 Partnership Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 312, as amended, s. 64.
3 (1986), 33 B.L.R. 125 (Ont. H.C.J.), affd 38 B.L.R. xxxiii (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused 38 B.L.R. xxxiii (S.C.C.).
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Graphic at a number of levels. It will be argued first that the two
cases give conflicting statements of legal doctrine, and that the
Nordile decision is therefore likely to destabilize existing legal and
commercial practices.
In the second part of the article it will be argued that this
doctrinal conflict is rooted in the differing political and moral
attitudes which informed each court's interpretation of the
limited-partnership legislation. Juxtaposed with one another,
these decisions illustrate the importance of judicial values and
assumptions in statutory construction.
Finally, the Nordile decision provides an opportunity to recon-
sider whether limited partners, whose rights and obligations look
increasingly like those of corporate shareholders, should continue
to be treated as partners for income tax purposes. It will be argued
in the third part of the article that the tax preferences now
available to limited partners should be curtailed.
II. LIMITED PARTNER LIABILITY: DOCTRINAL TENSIONS
1. Overview of the Legal Issues
The litigation in Haughton Graphic and Nordile revolved
around the interpretation of two analogous provisions in the B.C.
and Alberta limited partnership statutes. Section 64 of the B.C.
Partnership Act4 states:
64. A limited partner is not liable a, a general partner unless he takes
part in the management of the business.
The provision in the Alberta Partnership Act is similar, but
instead of "management" it uses the term "control". 5 Virtually
identical provisions exist in most of the common law provinces and
the territories. 6 They reflect the unique combination of traditional
4 Supra, footnote 2.
5 R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2, as amended, s. 63. There are some other differences between the
Alberta and B.C. provisions as well. The Alberta section provides that "[a] limited
partner does not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to exercising his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business"
(emphasis added). However, none of the judges in either case commented upon these
additional words in the Alberta statute, or their absence in the B.C. provision.
6 Most jurisdictions use the term "control": see, for example, the Limited Partnerships
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16, s. 13(1); the Limited Partnership Act, S.N.B. 1984, c. L-9.1, s.
17(1); the Limited Partnerships Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 259, s. 17; and the Limited
Partnerships Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-13, s. 12. Yukon appears to be the only other
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partnership and limited-liability elements which characterizes the
limited partnership. This hybrid business vehicle was not recog-
nized at common law. Under the general principles of partnership
law, all partners were personally liable for unpaid partnership
debts, to the full extent of their assets.7 Attempts to limit the
liability of so-called "passive" investors by contract met with
mixed success in the courts.
8
General partnerships are still governed by this principle of
personal liability. However, legislation now allows for the
creation of limited partnerships, which offer a virtual guarantee of
limited liability subject to certain conditions. 9 First, there must
always be at least one general partner to stand behind the business
to the full extent of her assets. Managerial power rests almost
exclusively with this general partner or partners. The limited
partners must not interfere in the management or control of the
partnership business. They have the power to veto certain major
decisions, but otherwise are required to remain passive. If limited
partners do take part in management or control they may become
liable as general partners pursuant to s. 64 of the B.C. Partnership
Act or its counterparts in other provinces.
The legislative balance of powers and liabilities within the
limited partnership has been undermined to some extent by
allowing corporations to perform the role of general partner. If the
sole general partner is a corporation with no assets, creditors are
effectively in the same position as if the business was incorporated
from the outset. This in itself may not be objectionable within the
framework of our legal and commercial systems, in which corpora-
tions are recognized as separate legal persons for almost all
purposes. However, Nordile and Haughton Graphic illustrate how
promoters can manipulate this combination of corporate and
partnership forms in order to avoid certain obligations which are
fundamental to the limited partnership form. In particular, limited
partners may attempt to use the corporation as a vehicle for
indirectly managing or controlling the partnership business.
jurisdiction, besides B.C., which uses the term "management": see the Partnership Act,
R.S.Y. 1986, c. 127, s. 63.
7 See Lyle R. Hepburn and William J. Strain, Limited Partnerships (Don Mills, Richard
DeBoo Publishers, 1984), pp. 1-1 to 1-7; and Lindley and Banks on Partnership, 16th ed.
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), pp. 7 3 3 -5 .
8 See Lindley and Banks, ibid., at pp. 5-29.
9 These basic conditions are set out in ss. 50, 55 to 58 and 64 of the B.C. Partnership Act,
supra, footnote 2.
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By appointing themselves as directors or officers of the
corporate general partner, limited partners may be able to retain
their protected status but avoid the inconvenience of having to
remain passive. In Haughton Graphic, the court refused to give
effect to this legal structure, and held the limited partners
personally liable for the debts of the insolvent limited partnership.
In Nordile, however, the B.C. Court of Appeal came to the
opposite conclusion, holding that the limited partners had not
exposed themselves to liability despite exercising extensive
powers as managers of the corporate general partner.
The Nordile case also adds one new twist to the issue of limited-
partner liability. The court held that even if the defendants had
taken part in management, any personal liability on their part was
excluded by the terms of their contract with the plaintiff. This
alternative basis for the decision suggests that it may now be
possible to alter the statutory balance of powers and responsibil-
ities within limited partnerships simply by contracting out of
certain aspects of the legislative regime.
2. Facts and Issues in Nordile
The judgments in Nordile are short on detail, but documents
filed by the parties provide a more complete picture of the facts
and arguments presented in court. John Breckenridge and his co-
defendant Hubert Rebiffe were the two subscribing limited
partners of Arman Rental Properties Limited Partnership
("Arman") when it was formed on December 31, 1980. By the
time of trial, Arman had a total of 63 limited partners, including
the two defendants. 10 The sole general partner of Arman was a
corporation - Arbutus Management Inc. ("Arbutus") - in
which each of the defendants were minority shareholders. The
defendants also acted as directors and officers of Arbutus. This
structure is strikingly similar, though not identical, to that
considered in Haughton Graphic.
In 1981 the plaintiff, Nordile Holdings Ltd. ("Nordile"), sold
some commercial real property to Arman, taking back a second
mortgage as part of the purchase price. Arman eventually
defaulted on its mortgage payments and, in 1985, the first
mortgagee foreclosed its interest. By the time Nordile obtained
10 Statement of Claim, para. 6.
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judgment against Arman and Arbutus for the balance owing on
the second mortgage, both were insolvent. Nordile then sued
Breckenridge and Rebiffe personally to recover the amount of the
unsatisfied judgment. The threshold question was whether Breck-
enridge and Rebiffe had taken part in the "management" of
Arman, thereby rendering themselves liable as general partners
under s. 64 of the Partnership Act.
The exact nature of the defendants' involvement in the business
is not very clear from the public record, as the parties proceeded
on a fairly succinct agreed statement of facts. It appears Brecken-
ridge was "primarily responsible for the operations of Arbutus","
and that Rebiffe also helped to manage Arbutus but "to a lesser
extent".12 The defendants were the only officers of Arbutus in
1981 when the purchase from Nordile took place, Breckenridge
being the president and Rebiffe the secretary.
At the end of 1985, Rebiffe resigned his post and Breckenridge
acted thereafter as the company's sole officer. 13 The agreed facts
indicate that "major management decisions such as the purchase
of real property" required majority approval by the directors. 14
From 1981 until August 30, 1984, the defendants constituted only
a minority or, at most, 50% of the board of Arbutus. From August
30, 1984 onward, however, they comprised the majority of
directors. It was during this latter period that the first mortgagee
commenced foreclosure proceedings against Arman. 15
Thus far the story suggests that the defendants were quite
intimately involved in the affairs of Arbutus and Arman.
However, the statement of facts also discloses that "day to day
management decisions regarding the operations of Arman were
made by a staff of property managers employed by Arbutus. ' '16
Though no details are supplied about the identity of these
employees, the clear implication is that Breckenridge and Rebiffe
maintained some distance from routine managerial activities.
More importantly, the agreed facts state that the defendants "par-
ticipated in the management [of Arman]. . . 'solely in their capac-
11 Para. 25 of the agreed facts, cited in the unreported reasons of Esson C.J. at trial
(Vancouver Registry No. A870646, February 19,1991).
12 Court of Appeal judgment, supra, footnote 1, at p. 185.
13 Agreed facts, para. 13.
14 Para. 27.
15 Ibid., para. 12.
16 Para. 28, cited in the unreported reasons of the trial judge, supra, footnote 11.
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ities as directors and officers of the general partner, Arbutus' ".17
This turned out to be a major concession on Nordile's part.
There is also some confusion about the nature and extent of the
defendants' involvement in the transaction with Nordile.
According to the agreed facts, Nordile's sole shareholder and
manager "had no direct contact with John Breckenridge and only
a brief telephone conversation with Hugh Rebiffe". 18 However,
on appeal Nordile asserted that both defendants "participated
directly in the acquisition of Nordile's property". 19 Documents
filed in court show that both signed the sale and purchase
agreement (the "agreement") and the mortgage as authorized
signatories of Arbutus, which executed the documents on behalf
of Arman.
20
Moreover, a week before signing the agreement, Breckenridge
gave Nordile a disclosure statement as required by the Real Estate
Act.21 Section 28 of that Act prohibits any person licensed under
the statute from directly or indirectly offering to acquire real
estate unless she has first disclosed certain information to the
owner. The disclosure must indicate, among other things, that the
person is a "licensee" under the Real Estate Act, and that she is
acquiring the real estate for herself or a corporation in which she is
interested.
The disclosure statement provided by Breckenridge to Nordile
stated in part the following:
Please be advised that I, John Breckenridge am licensed under the British
Columbia Real Estate Act and that:
1. [Arman] will be offering to buy real estate ... which is owned by you
and which is described as...
[Arbutus] is the General Partner of the Purchaser, I am a shareholder,
director and officer of [Arbutus]. Some Licensees of [Arbutus] are Limited
Partners of the Purchaser.
2. [Arman] is purchasing the real estate and intends to hold the real estate
as an investment for an indefinite period...
3. This disclosure is being made prior to the presentation of my offer to you
to purchase the said real estate or interest therein.
17 Para. 29, cited in the Court of Appeal decision, supra, footnote 1, at p. 185.
18 Para. 23.
19 Appellant's factum in answer to Cross Appeal, p. 13.
20 Rebiffe signed the agreement, identifying himself as a Director of Arbutus acting on
behalf of Arman. Both defendants signed the mortgage as "Authorized Signatories" of
Arbutus in trust for Arman.
21 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 356, as amended.
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4. The parties hereto acknowledge that [Arman] is a limited partnership
formed under the laws of British Columbia. The parties hereto agree that the
obligations of the Limited Partnership shall not personally be binding upon,
nor shall resort hereunder be had to, the property of any of the limited
partners of the Limited Partnership or assignees of their interest in the
Limited Partnership as represented by Units of the Limited Partnership but
shall only be binding upon and resort may only be had to the property of the
Limited Partnership or the General Partner of the Limited Partnership.
Paragraph 4 was not required by the legislation, but was appar-
ently added to the disclosure statement on the initiative of Breck-
enridge or his solicitor. This paragraph was also incorporated as
recital F in the agreement between Nordile and Arman, dated
April 7, 1981. These two documents became a focal point of
argument in the case.
3. The Decisions
In the result, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal held
in favour of the defendants, unlike the Haughton Graphic case in
which the limited partners were held personally liable. At trial
Esson C.J. concluded that the defendants' involvement with the
business amounted to taking part in management and ordinarily
would have attracted liability under s. 64. However, he found that
the section was contractually excluded from applying to the defen-
dants in their dealings with Nordile because of the disclosure
clause in recital F of the agreement.
The Court of Appeal not only dismissed Nordile's appeal, but
strengthened the trial decision in favour of the defendants.
Reversing the trial judge's initial finding, they held that Brecken-
ridge and Rebiffe were protected from liability under s. 64 because
they took part in managing the business only in their capacities as
directors and officers of the corporate general partner, and not in
their capacities as limited partners. Although this alone was suffi-
cient to decide the case, the appeal judges also confirmed the
decision at trial that s. 64 was in any event rendered inapplicable
by recital F of the agreement.
The reasons for decision at both levels are brief and somewhat
obscure. Despite endorsing certain aspects of the judgment in
Haughton Graphic, the trial judge and the Court of Appeal
approached the limited partnership legislation from a strikingly
different perspective. At least in the circumstances of this case,
they inclined towards a very narrow interpretation of s. 64,
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thereby affording limited partners a great deal of leeway to engage
in strategic planning to avoid personal liability. If followed,
Nordile will shift the economic risks associated with limited
partnership ventures further away from individual investors and
onto the shoulders of financial creditors and other third parties.
The reasoning of the trial and appeal courts is analyzed more
closely below.
4. Reasons at Trial
Esson C.J. concluded without hesitation that the defendants
"clearly took part in the management" of the partnership business
within the "plain meaning" of s. 64. He dismissed the defendants'
argument that the B.C. provision requires a greater degree of
managerial involvement than other provincial statutes, which
target limited partners who take part in the control of the
business.22 Indeed, he held that "[m]anagement covers a broader
scope of activity than control and includes any activity covered by
control." 23 As such, the defendants were prima facie liable as
general partners under s. 64.
This appears to be the first judicial interpretation of the term
"management" in s. 64. Unfortunately, the status of Esson C.J.'s
comments is somewhat uncertain after the appeal judgment.
Though it affirmed the result at trial, the Court of Appeal side-
stepped the issue of what kind or degree of activity will constitute
"management". The appeal judges neither questioned nor
endorsed Esson C.J.'s construction, making it difficult to know
what persuasive value it may have in another case.
Breckenridge and Rebiffe argued that even if they did take part
in management they should be shielded from personal liability on
the strength of the "specific reliance" analysis adopted in some
American cases.24 According to this analysis, liability does not
attach unless the plaintiff creditor has actually been led to believe
that the limited partner is a general partner. This was clearly not
the case in Nordile, as the agreed facts stated that,25
22 See footnotes 5 and 6.
23 Unreported reasons of the trial judge, supra, footnote 11.
24 The American cases are discussed by Eric Apps in, "Limited Partnerships and the
'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991), 70 Can. Bar
Rev. 619; Robert D. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited
Partnerships" (1983), 21 Alta. L.R. 303; and William F. Ehrcke and Rosemarie
Wertschek, "An Introduction to Limited Partnerships" (1981), 39 Advocate 387.
25 Para. 22.
14-21 C.B.L.J.
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•.. Richard Manders as President. .. of Nordile was not relying on Hubert
Rebiffe or John Breckenridge with regard to making payments under said
mortgage. Richard Manders admits that at the time of sale he was satisfied
that Arbutus and Arman would have a sufficient cash flow derived from
revenue generated by the rental of the Property to meet ... mortgage
obligations...
The underlying premise of the specific reliance argument is that a
finding of liability would lead to a windfall if the complaining
creditor never had a reasonable expectation that the limited
partners would stand behind the obligations of the partnership.
This line of argument was flatly rejected in Haughton Graphic.
In his judgment, 26 Eberle J. pointed out that the Alberta
provision,
... does not contain any requirement of reliance. If reliance was a necessary
precondition to unlimited liability for a limited partner, appropriate words
should be in the statute. To conclude that the words in the section require
such a condition would not, in my view, be an interpretation of the words
used in the section, but would be a clear addition of a second, distinct
requirement•...
... What engages the liability of the limited partner is his taking part in
the control of the business.
In Nordile, Esson C.J. expressly followed Haughton Graphic on
this point. In applying s. 64 it was irrelevant, in his opinion,
whether the defendants' conduct did or did not lead Nordile to
rely on them as general partners. On its face this finding would
seem to render the disclosure statements provided to Nordile
totally unhelpful to the defendants. If it was not important to
determine whether Nordile relied on the defendants, then it
should not matter what Nordile's managers understood about the
legal structure of Arman. However, Esson C.J. did not stop here.
Rather, he went on to hold that the parties had effectively
contracted out of s. 64 altogether.
The question, as Esson C.J. put it, was "whether the liability of
the defendants which would otherwise flow from section 64 is
excluded by the terms of the contract between the plaintiff and
Arman for the sale of the property".27 Breckenridge and Rebiffe
argued that Nordile was precluded from suing them by virtue of
the disclosure statement, and by virtue of recital F in the
agreement which simply repeated verbatim the final paragraph of
2 6 Supra, footnote 3, at pp. 132-3.
27 Page 3 of the unreported reasons at trial, supra, footnote 11.
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the disclosure statement. Esson C.J. was reluctant to rely on the
disclosure statement, perhaps because it did not purport to create
any contractual relations. However, he decided that the single
paragraph incorporated in the agreement could stand on its own.
In his words,28
... the language of recital F is clear enough in providing that Nordile could
have resort only to the property of the limited partnership or the general
partner and that the obligations of the limited partnership were not to be
binding upon any of the limited partners. The effect of that is to contrac-
tually preclude the application of s. 64 to the limited partners.
This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.
5. Reasons on Appeal
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial decision on two separate
grounds, each of which warrants consideration.
(1) Corporate Structure
First, the appeal judges held that Breckenridge and Rebiffe
were insulated from personal liability by virtue of their dual roles
within the legal structure of Arman. Nordile's concession, that the
defendants had "participated in the management ... [of Arman]
'solely in their capacities as directors and officers of the general
partner' ", was, in their opinion, sufficient on its own to decide the
case. Writing for the court, Gibbs J.A. reasoned that "[a]cting
solely in one capacity necessarily negates acting in any other
capacity. ,
29
In relying so heavily on Nordile's concession, the Court of
Appeal appears to have elevated a factual statement about the
formal structure of Arman to a conclusion about the legal implica-
tions of that structure. McEachern C.J.B.C. went even further,
warning in a concurring judgment that it would "destroy the
Salomon principle" to "conclude that an officer of a corporation
acting solely in that capacity [could] be held personally liable in a
different capacity". 30 The Chief Justice did leave room for a
2 8 Ibid., at p. 4.
29 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 185.
30 Ibid., at p. 186. McEachern C.J.B.C. was referring to the House of Lords' decision in
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1987] A.C. 22, 66 L.J. Ch. 35, which is generally regarded
as having established the principle of shareholder limited liability in the case of so-called
one-person companies.
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different conclusion in a case with "much more specific language
and facts" showing that "the limited partner in that capacity
engaged in management". 31 None the less, his appeal to funda-
mental principles of corporate limited liability in this context sits in
sharp contrast to the judgment in Haughton Graphic, with its
emphasis on strict enforcement of personal liability.
In Haughton Graphic, Eberle J. took the view that liability will
always arise under the statute when two conditions are fulfilled:
"[o]ne is that the person be a limited partner and the second is that
he take part in the control of the business." 32 Indeed he implied
strongly that the section would inevitably catch any person who,
"in addition to being an officer . . . of the corporate general
partner, seeks also to take advantage of personal limited liability
as a limited partner in the limited partnership". 33 This is a fairer,
more appropriate interpretation of the statute, particularly if the
courts are not prepared to inquire into creditor reliance. It
preserves in substance the balance of powers and responsibilities
between general and limited partners, which is the structural
foundation of the limited-partnership form. Eberle J.'s approach
thus offers some degree of protection to third parties from
managerial interference by limited partners.
The decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal, on the other hand,
significantly undermines the statutory division of risk and respon-
sibility in limited partnerships, and erodes the interests of third
parties. If limited partners can avoid personal liability simply by
taking on another organizational identity as corporate managers,
then s. 64 is effectively rendered toothless. Many more business
owners and investors can now be expected to exploit the income
tax advantages of direct ownership while retaining the limited
liability and managerial power of a corporate shareholder-
director.
Moreover, the formalistic division of roles underlying Nordile
simply does not jibe with the social realities of the marketplace.
Although Breckenridge and Rebiffe may have taken on several
legal identities within Arman, these roles were inevitably blurred
in their dealings with third parties. Breckenridge's disclosure
statement offers a telling illustration of this ambiguity. The
31 Ibid.
32 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 134.
33 Ibid.
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statement begins by disclosing that Arman intends to make an
offer to buy Nordile's property but, a paragraph later, refers to
"my offer [i.e., Breckenridge's offer] ... to purchase the said real
estate". This inconsistency in wording may have been a minor
clerical slip, but it clearly demonstrates the potential confusion
that follows a segregation of limited-partner status from a
management role.
There were several other, more substantive grounds upon
which the court might have distinguished Haughton Graphic. For
example, it was obvious in Haughton Graphic that the general
partner had been incorporated by the defendants solely for the
purposes of the limited partnership. 34 In contrast, Arbutus was
formed several years before Arman, and was apparently engaged
in other business activities besides acting as general partner. 35
In addition, Breckenridge and Rebiffe were only minority
shareholders in Arbutus, and for at least part of the relevant
period they did not exercise legal control over its board of
directors. In Haughton Graphic, the main defendant was the
controlling shareholder of the general partner. Perhaps more
importantly, the evidence in Haughton Graphic painted a picture
of much more extensive and open involvement of the defendants
in daily business operations, with the defendants even repre-
senting themselves as officers of the limited partnership.
It is striking that neither Gibbs J.A. nor McEachern C.J.B.C.
referred explicitly to any of these potentially distinguishing
factors, preferring instead to rest their decisions on abstract
principles pertaining to the integrity of the corporate structure.
The judges did not comment on the trial judge's finding that the
defendants had "clearly" taken part in "management". Indeed,
there is no consideration of the defendants' conduct. In a subse-
quent case, the Court of Appeal may well reconsider the implica-
tions of Nordile and limit the case to its particular facts - notably
the concession by Nordile that the defendants acted solely in their
corporate capacities. In the meantime, however, investors and
creditors are left uncertain as to the law on this point.
(2) Section 64 Excluded by Contract
The Court of Appeal also affirmed, with little discussion, the
3 4 Ibid., at p. 127.
35 Statement of agreed facts, paras. 4 and 8; Statement of Defence, para. 5.
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trial judge's decision that any liability on the part of the defen-
dants under s. 64 was "excluded" by virtue of recital F in the
agreement. The disclosure statement received no mention. It is
surprising the court accepted this argument so readily, particularly
since its first conclusion - that the defendants had acted only in
their capacities as corporate managers - was sufficient to decide
the case. It is even more surprising in light of the very brief and
general nature of recital F. Although it describes the basic legal
structure of a limited partnership, recital F does not refer
expressly to s. 64. Indeed, it does not convey any express intention
to exclude any aspect of the legislative regime. Moreover, it
appears that Breckenridge and Rebiffe were never personally
identified as limited partners, either in the agreement or in the
disclosure statement. Certainly they were not made party to the
agreement in their personal capacities.
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal also expressly approved the
trial judge's decision to reject the specific reliance defence, even
though this was unnecessary to dispose of the appeal. Like the trial
judge, the court saw no contradiction in denying the relevance of
creditor reliance while at the same time enforcing a loosely
worded exclusion clause against the creditor.
It seems unlikely, given his strong language in Haughton
Graphic, that Eberle J. would have recognized such a delicate
distinction. After rejecting the defendants' testimony that they
had scrupulously explained their limited liability status in all
dealings with Haughton Graphic Ltd., Eberle J. went on to add
the following: 36
I do not think the outcome would be any different if, contrary to my
findings, [the defendant] had explained fully to [the plaintiff's agent] the
legal particulars of the limited partnership, the legal relationship of the
persons and entities concerned, the precise nature of the liability of each of
them, and to whom the liabilities were owed. I say this because under s. 63 of
the Alberta Act it is clear that the legal relationships can be altered by
activity on the part of the limited partner.
Eberle J. did acknowledge that in some "unusual situation ... it
might be argued that the creditor had in some way estopped
himself from relying on s. 63". 37 It is highly improbable, however,
that he would consider such an estoppel to arise from the brief
generalities set out in recital F of the Nordile/Arman agreement.
36 Haughton Graphic, supra, footnote 3, at p. 133.
37 Ibid.
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III. THE POWER OF JUDICIAL VALUES
It will be apparent by now that I consider the decision in Nordile
to be unfair and prejudicial to those members of the public who
deal with limited partnerships. Still, it must be acknowledged that
s. 64 of the Partnership Act does not clearly require a different
result - it simply leaves open these kinds of questions. Funda-
mentally, the divergence between Nordile and Haughton Graphic
illustrates how judicial values and attitudes impact on statutory
construction.
The limited-partnership form is characterized by a profound
tension between the traditional model of partnership, in which
creditors may hold partners fully responsible for the firm's debts,
and the modern corporate concept of virtually absolute limited
liability. Within this legislative framework, it is perfectly possible
to incline either towards the enforcement of personal liability, as
in Haughton Graphic, or to defend the integrity of the corporate
veil, as in Nordile. A major determining factor, I would argue, is
the moral and political attitude of the presiding judge towards
limited liability.
If limited liability is conceived of as a privilege granted by the
state under certain conditions to further a broad public interest, a
failure to comply with those conditions must result in the loss of
that privilege. Within this paradigm the court's role is to protect
the public interest against attempts by individual investors to
obtain the benefits of limited liability without its responsibilities
and burdens. This conception informed the judgment of Eberle J.
in Haughton Graphic. The statutory protection from personal
liability was strictly conditional, in his eyes, on the limited partners
remaining passive. Participating in the control of the business in
any capacity was "patently prohibited by the legislation" and
would necessarily result in a loss of limited liability. 38 Eberle J.'s
decision displays a clear lack of tolerance for private investors who
try to "take advantage" 39 of limited liability while avoiding its
constraints.
The decision in Nordile is founded upon a very different set of
assumptions, namely that private capital owners are entitled to
carry on business with limited liability as a matter of right, and
38 Ibid., quoting Flannigan, supra, footnote 24.
39 Supra, text at footnote 33.
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courts are justified in interfering with that right only in the most
compelling cases of unfairness or deceit. From this perspective,
private arrangements are deemed effective so long as they satisfy
formal legal requirements, regardless of broader regulatory objec-
tives. Underlying this approach is a normative stance which takes
individual liberty and freedom of contract as its point of departure
and equates these values with the public interest.
Thus, in Nordile the judges' primary concern was whether the
formal legal relations between the individual parties were
effective to shield the defendants from personal liability. They
gave little attention to issues of legislative policy and the possible
interests of wider society. Indeed, the judges' concerns about
corporate limited liability largely overshadowed any discussion of
the limited-partnership form or its legislative framework.
McEachern C.J.B.C.'s warning about the need to protect the
"Salomon principle" sits in sharp contrast to Eberle J.'s disap-
proval of those who would take advantage of the limited-
partnership vehicle without bearing its burdens.
Moreover, both the trial and appeal judges in Nordile gave the
disclosure clause in the agreement its maximum breadth. Without
any discussion of the legislative policies which might lie behind
s. 64, they held that it was effectively excluded by the agreement,
despite the lack of any express reference to the section or any
stated intention to contract out of the legislative scheme. The
judges were undeterred by the fact that their decision could render
s. 64 meaningless for anyone astute enough to put the necessary
corporate structure and contractual terms in place.
Obviously, the relative power of these competing value systems
may shift with the context. It would be interesting to know, for
example, how the B.C. courts would have decided Nordile had the
plaintiff been an individual consumer rather than a corporate real
estate developer. The case might be even harder if it involved a
claim for personal injury damages rather than a contract debt. In
such circumstances, a judge may think differently about private
ordering and the importance of legislative policy. In all cases,
however, the application of s. 64 will turn largely upon the
normative perspective of the court.
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IV. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND THE TAX SYSTEM: GIVE ME
SHELTER!
I have suggested that the difference between Haughton Graphic
and Nordile lies fundamentally in judicial values. Legal analysts
are therefore sure to disagree about which decision is better.
However, those who prefer the approach taken in Nordile must
also be prepared, in my view, to reopen the question of limited-
partnership taxation.
Lurking in the background of both these cases are the income
tax benefits associated with limited-partnership investments.
Although income tax issues were not raised directly in either case,
the legal structures put in place by the defendants in Haughton
Graphic and Nordile were almost certainly motivated by a desire
to claim deductions available to limited partners under the Income
Tax Act.n°
As a vehicle for carrying on business, the limited partnership
generally does not offer the same degree of organizational flexi-
bility or guarantee of limited liability as does the corporate form.
Rather, the primary reason for investing in a limited partnership is
tax-related. A recent investment advice column summed up the
modern-day purpose of limited partnerships nicely: "they are
meant to provide a small return, a tax shelter and some portfolio
diversification for high income individuals".
41
A brief explanation is in order for those unfamiliar with the
mechanics of tax shelters. Unlike a corporation, a partnership
does not comprise a separate legal entity from its members.'
Limited partners are therefore considered to hold a direct interest
in partnership assets even though they enjoy a degree of limited
liability similar in most respects to that of corporate shareholders.
As a result, limited partners may deduct their proportionate share
of any business losses incurred by the partnership in computing
their incomes for tax purposes. 42
These deductions in effect "shelter" or reduce the partner's
40 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, as amended (the "ITA").
41 "How to invest in the oilpatch - and get a tax break in the deal", Financial Times, July 6,
1992. See also McQuillan, Thomas and Cochrane, Understanding the Taxation of
Partnerships, 2nd ed. (Don Mills, CCH Canadian Ltd., 1987), para. 410, where the
authors confirm the tax shelter purpose underlying the popularity of limited partner-
ships, and note that once the limited partners' ability to deduct losses is exhausted, the
partnership is frequently rolled over into a corporation.
42 See ITA, s. 96(1); and McQuillan, ibid., at para. 204 and chapter 2 generally.
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income from other sources. This is especially advantageous if the
business losses do not result from out-of-pocket expenses, but
rather from accelerated rates of depreciation permitted under the
ITA. 43 Moreover, current losses may be recoverable at a later time
if partnership property can be sold for a capital gain, which is
taxed at a lower rate than ordinary business income and may even
be tax exempt. 44
Shareholders are not entitled to the same flow-through of
expenses incurred by their corporations. Since the corporation is a
separate person in law, profits and losses belong to the company
itself.45 Shareholders ordinarily are not taxed on corporate income
until it is paid out to them in the form of dividends, and similarly
they may not deduct corporate losses.46
The separate personality of the corporation is also the basis for
the shareholder's limited liability. The shareholder may be
appointed as a director, senior officer or employee, and as such
may manage the company business without risking liability for the
corporation's debts. The effect of Nordile, however, is to extend
virtually the same insulation from liability to limited partners.
Indeed, McEachern C.J.B.C. in his concurring judgment
appealed directly to the principle of separate corporate person-
ality in holding that the defendants had successfully avoided
personal liability under s. 64. The case largely blurs the distinction
between limited partners and corporate shareholders for all
purposes except income tax, making it increasingly difficult to
justify the flow-through of tax losses to limited partners.
43 It should be noted that the amount of losses from a business or property and the amount
of investment tax credits which can be claimed by a limited partner are restricted to her
"at-risk amount" in respect of the partnership at the end of its fiscal period. The "at-risk"
rules were introduced to prevent limited partners from obtaining tax shelter benefits
which exceed the value of their actual investment in the limited partnership: see ITA,
ss. 96(2.1) to (2.7), ss. 127(8.1) to (8.5). See also McQuillan, ibid., at paras. 415 to 465.
44 The ITA requires only 3/4 of a capital gain to be included in income as a "taxable capital
gain": see ss. 3(b), 38. Taxable capital gains realized on the sale of partnership property
are allocated to the partners, who are eligible for the lifetime capital gains exemption for
up to $75,000 in respect of such amounts, provided they satisfy the conditions of s. 110.6.
Section 110.6(11) is an anti-avoidance provision which aims in part to prevent a partner
from claiming the exemption for a share of taxable capital gains of the partnership which
exceeds her proportionate share of partnership income.
45 Under the ITA, a corporation is a "person" and a taxpayer in its own right: ss. 2(1),
248(1).
46 Individual shareholders must include in their income any dividends received from the
corporation: see ITA, ss. 82(1), 90(1). For shareholders of corporations resident in
Canada, the tax burden in respect of such dividends may be reduced by the dividend tax
credit mechanism: see ITA, ss. 82(1)(b), 121.
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The case for allowing limited partners to deduct partnership
losses was tenuous from the outset. These investors do not assume
the same risks as general partners or sole proprietors and, as
indicated earlier, they invest mostly to shelter other income from
taxation. This is one of the most obvious examples of market
distortion in the income tax system, altering as it does the choices
investors would otherwise make in the absence of a tax incentive.
More importantly, it is a severely inequitable tax preference - it
reduces the effective tax rate on individuals with very high
incomes, undermining the redistributive potential of our
progressive rate schedule.
47
There may be good reasons for supporting industries which
historically have raised capital through limited-partnership
financing. However, this support should be directed to the
particular types of economic activity we wish to promote or
protect. Under the current system, the subsidy is extended to
anyone who employs a particular form of investment structure,
regardless of the nature of production undertaken. This approach
assumes that public support is equally warranted for such diverse
enterprises as film making, natural resource exploration and, as
Nordile illustrates, the commercial real estate industry.
In addition, there are serious problems associated with using the
tax system to deliver these subsidies to industry. There is no upper
limit on the amount of revenue which may be lost through the
sheltering of limited-partner income. It would be preferable to
determine the levels of support which are fair and efficient and to
establish a specific fund for that purpose. Direct subsidies also
tend to be more visible and allow for greater political account-
ability and cost-benefit review.48
The Department of Finance reported recently that the
deduction of limited partnership losses had a cost in terms of
revenue forgone of $125 million in 1988 and $170 million in 1989. 49
47 In 1989, 64% of all deductions in respect of losses incurred by limited partners or non-
active partners were claimed by tax filers with incomes of $50,000 or greater (comprising
8.3% of all returns filed). Persons with incomes of $100,000 and over (1.2% of tax filers)
claimed 43% of the total. These figures were calculated from Revenue Canada,
Taxation, 1991 Taxation Statistics (Ottawa, 1991), Table 15, at p. 302. They are conser-
vative estimates, because the income brackets are based on income for tax purposes,
after deducting limited-partnership losses (ibid., at p. 27).
48 For a review of the possible advantages and disadvantages of delivering government
assistance through direct spending programs versus tax expenditures, see Stanley S.
Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Harvard University Press, 1985), pp.
99-108.
49 Canada, Department of Finance, Government of Canada Personal Income Tax
Expenditures (December 1992), p. 12.
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Although the amount of this revenue loss is itself notable, the
more important question is whether this tax expenditure produces
any return to the economy in terms of employment, profits and
other indicators. One recent study indicates that the transfer of tax
losses to limited partners via the flow-through system is a highly
inefficient way to deliver support to industry, because of the
transactional costs involved in forming limited partnerships and
the premiums demanded by investors to compensate for financial
risk. The author of the study concludes that these tax incentives
"have the potential to waste large amounts of tax revenue", and
may produce "a level of hidden costs that is unlikely to be
tolerated in a system of open subsidization". 50 It is difficult to
argue that direct subsidies would represent any greater
government "interference" in the market than that found in the
current system, in which investors are encouraged to place their
capital with unprofitable enterprises.
There are undoubtedly legitimate organizational reasons for
choosing the limited-partnership structure, and no obvious reason
to remove this option from the forms of business organization
available in Canada. However, the fact that limited partners own
an undivided interest in partnership property for the general
purposes of the law does not necessitate parallel treatment for
income tax purposes. Governments wringing their hands over
budget deficits should be eager to eliminate unproductive and
unfair tax preferences. The Nordile decision reinforces the case
for curtailing the tax shelter benefits presently available to limited
partners and establishing a system which treats them more like
corporate shareholders for tax purposes.
50 Glenn P. Jenkins, "Tax Shelter Finance: How Efficient Is It?" (1990), 38 Canadian Tax
J. 270, at p. 280.
